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At the Crossroads of Policy Ambitions and Political Reality: 
Reflections on the Prospects of LNG Development in Russia 
Dr. Roman Sidortsov, JD, LL.M* 
Abstract 
With world’s largest conventional natural gas reserves, flat domestic demand, and uncertain 
demand for pipeline gas exports, Russia is poised to become an important player in the 
global LNG market. Indeed, the Russian leadership named LNG development as one of the 
key features of its energy policy. This article aims to examine this policy ambition and reflect 
on the barriers to and opportunities in realising it. The article provides an overview of LNG 
projects in Russia and examines the policy rationale for their expansion. It discusses the 
support that the Russian government provides to LNG projects and analyses political, legal, 
and regulatory barriers to LNG development. The article reaches a conclusion that in the 
absence of reversal of the Russian leadership’s patronage policy, applied to only a few 
companies, the country faces a thorny road to becoming a key supplier in the global LNG 
market. 
1. Introduction 
In August 2017, the 300-metre liquefied natural gas (LNG) tanker ‘the Christophe de 
Margerie’ owned by Sovkomflot, a Russian state-controlled company, delivered a cargo of 
LNG from Hammerfest in Norway to Boryeong in South Korea.1 The voyage set a few 
records – the ship travelled through the Northern Sea Route (NSR) in record time – six and a 
half days – without an icebreaker escort, and it reached its destination in 19 days, 
approximately 30% faster than the conventional southern route through the Suez Canal.2 The 
voyage also generated several discourses, including opening of the Arctic due to climate 
change, economic advantages of navigation through the NSR, and Russia’s rise as a key 
player on the global LNG market.3 
The latter discourse was premised on the fact that the Christophe de Margerie is a tanker built 
specifically to serve the Yamal LNG project named after the gas-rich Siberian peninsula on 
which the project is located.4 The discourse also had a particular undertone portraying Russia 
as a country open to international business cooperation and capable of following through on 
its policy ambitions in the Arctic region despite all the economic and geopolitical odds.5 It is 
difficult to dismiss this undertone outright – Yamal LNG is an international project 
developed by CNPC, a Chinese state-owned oil and gas company, Total, a French oil and gas 
supermajor, and Novatek, a Russian private company and a self-described independent 
natural gas producer. The tanker is named after Total’s former CEO who died in an airplane 
                                                 
* Assistant Professor of Energy Policy, Department of Social Sciences, Michigan Technological University. 
1 Patrick Barkham, Russian tanker sails through Arctic without icebreaker for first time, The Guadian, (24 
August 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2017/aug/24/russian-tanker-sails-arctic-without-
icebreaker-first-time. 
2 Id.  
3 Id.  
4 Id. 




crash at a Moscow airport.6 The Yamal LNG project appears to be on schedule and within 
budget notwithstanding the limited access to international capital due to the economic 
sanctions imposed by the United States and European Union in 2014.7 These facts create a 
strong impression that Russia is on track to increase its share of the global LNG market from 
the meagre 3.6% and realise its vast potential and policy ambition for LNG development.8  
The overarching purpose of this article is to examine this policy ambition and reflect on the 
barriers to and opportunities in realising it. Correspondingly, the research question I aim to 
answer is: “In what ways is the Russian leadership’s policy ambition to develop LNG 
production and export capacity furthered or restricted by the current political, legal, and 
regulatory regime? To answer this question, I utilize the corroborative and complimentary 
discourse and legal analysis of policy statements by key Russian government decision-
makers, as well as applicable laws and regulations. In addition, I use various energy and 
government statistics as contextual data. 
The article commences with an overview of LNG projects in Russia and an examination of 
the policy rationale for their expansion. It continues with a discussion of the support that the 
Russian government provides to LNG projects. The article concludes with an analysis of 
barriers to LNG development in Russia that make realisation of the policy ambition a difficult 
task. 
2. LNG in Russia – a Brief Overview 
In 2014, Russia produced 21,225 bcf of dry natural gas, the second-largest amount in the 
world.9 It also exported a world-leading 6,848 bcf of dry natural gas, outgaining the second-
largest exporter, Qatar, by nearly 50%.10 In 2015, approximately 90% all Russia’s natural gas 
exports went to Europe via pipeline.11 Russia exported a sizable portion of the remaining 
10%, 500 bcf, to Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and China as LNG.12 All LNG exports came 
from Russia’s lone LNG plant, which is part of the Sakhalin II project located in the 
country’s Far East region.13 Better known in the West as the Sakhalin Energy LNG plant 
(‘Sakhalin LNG’), the facility receives natural gas from the Piltun-Astokhskoye and 
Lunskoye fields.14  
                                                 
6 BBC, Total's CEO Christophe de Margerie dies in Moscow plane crash, BBC (21 October 2014), 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-29699733.  
7 President of the Russian Federation, Transcript of the Meeting with the Chairman of Novatek's Board Leonid 
Mikhelson, Moscow, (31 October 2014) [hereinafter 31 November 2014 Transcript]. Transcript of the Meeting 
with the Chairman of Novatek's Board Leonid Mikhelson, Moscow, Moscow Region, Novo-Ogarevo, (14 
November 2016).  
8 President of the Russian Federation, Transcript of the Commission on the Strategic Development of the Energy 
Sector and Environmental Security meeting, Moscow Region, Novo-Ogarevo, (13 February 2013) [hereinafter 
13 February 2013 Transcript].  
9 U.S. Energy Information Administration, Russia, 
https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/analysis.cfm?iso=RUS (last visited 15 September 2017) [hereinafter EIA, 
Russia]. 
10 Id.  
11 EIA, Russia. 
12 Id. 
13 Id.  
14 Gazprom, Sakhalin II, http://www.gazprom.com/about/production/projects/lng/sakhalin2/ (last visited 15 
September 2017) [hereinafter Gazprom, Sakhalin 2]. 
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Sakhalin II was born in 1994 as a joint venture of Royal Dutch Shell plc, Mitsui & Co., Ltd. 
and Mitsubishi Corporation (collectively, ‘Sakhalin Energy’,) on one side and the 
Government of the Russian Federation and the Administration of the Sakhalin Region on the 
other.15  The parties entered a Production Sharing Agreement (PSA) to develop the 
aforementioned fields.16 Тhe project entered into a new phase in 2007 when Gazprom 
acquired 50% plus one share of the project’s stock.17  
Sakhalin LNG’s tenure as Russia’s lone LNG plant is projected to end in 2017, when Yamal 
LNG is commissioned. Similar to its Far Eastern counterpart, Yamal LNG is developed by an 
international consortium where the Russian member, Novatek in this case, is the majority 
shareholder (50% + one share). The plant will include three trains, each with an annual 
capacity of 5.5 Mt. Novatek claims to have placed long-term contracts for 95% of the project 
capacity with customers in both Europe and Asia.18 
Beyond Sakhalin LNG and Yamal LNG, the future of Russia’s LNG sector appears 
uncertain. The discourse surrounding potential LNG projects is similar to that of Russian 
pipeline expansion – full of overly ambitious statements that promise near-certainty but rarely 
lead to actual deliveries.19 For this reason, Table 1 below provides a cursory overview of the 
notable proposals.  
Table 1 Notable Proposed LNG Projects in Russia20 








Kirinskoye Block in Sakhalin III, one additional 
train 
Arctic LNG-2 Novatek Salmanovskoe (Utrennee) field, two to three trains 
with 12-18 Mt of annual capacity 
Yamal LNG expansion Novatek South Tambey field, one additional 5.5 Mt train 
Vladivostok LNG Gazprom Kovyktinskoe and Chayandinskoe fields via the 
Power of Siberia pipeline (in construction), 10-15 
Mt of annual capacity 
Baltic LNG Gazprom Western Siberia fields via the trunk pipeline 
system, 10 Mt of annual capacity 
Far East LNG Rosneft Chayvo field, Sakhalin I, 5 Mt of annual capacity 
Pechora LNG Rosneft Kumzhinskoye and Korovinskoye fields 
                                                 
15 Id. 
16 Id. Remarkably, Sakhalin II is one of just three PSAs in Russia. The Ministry of Energy of the Russian 
Federation, Energy of the Russian Federation the PSA Project Performance Results for 2011 Illustrate Their 
Effectiveness and Contribution to the Development of the Russian Economy (Rus.), (29 December 2011), 
retrieved from: http://minenergo.gov.ru/press/min_news/10423.html. Mazkov Evgeny, Legal Regulation of 
Geological Exploration and Extraction of Oil and Gas in the Continental Shelf of the Russian Federation, (2008) 
(unpublished candidate of legal studies dissertation, Moscow State Law Academy) (on file with author) at 66. 
17 Gazprom, Sakhalin 2. 
18 Novatek, Yamal LNG, http://www.novatek.ru/en/business/yamal-lng/ (last visited 15 September 2017) 
[hereinafter Novatek, Yamal LNG]. 
19 Edward Chow, Center for Strategic & International Studies, Russian Gas Stream or Dream?, (2 February 
2015), retrieved from: https://www.csis.org/analysis/russian-gas-stream-or-dream. 
20 The Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, Russian LNG: Progress and delay in 2017, (March 2017) retrieved 
from: https://www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/Russian-LNG-%E2%80%93-
Progress-and-delay-in-2017-OIES-Energy-Insight.pdf [hereinafter Oxford, 2017]. 
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Because the timelines of these projects are routinely revised, their future is hard to pin down 
beyond an educated guess. For example, the completion date of one of the ostensibly most 
certain projects, the Sakhalin LNG expansion, which Gazprom claimed was under 
development in 2014,21 was pushed back to 2021.22 Perhaps the most vivid example of this 
pattern is the Schtokman project that within a few short years went from being the harbinger 
of Russia’s contemporary global LNG ambitions to a project to be developed ‘by future 
generations’.23 Novatek might be in the best position to succeed in fulfilling its LNG 
ambitions. The company is getting much needed experience leading a large and complex 
project. As I elaborate below, it enjoys formidable support from the Russian government, and 
its license for the development of the Salmanovskoe (Utrennee) field appears to allow for 
LNG exports.  
3. Policy Rationale for LNG Expansion 
The policy case for LNG development in Russia is straightforward. Russia has the world’s 
largest conventional dry natural gas reserves.24 With a stagnant domestic market, natural gas 
exports present the only viable option for developing the vast reserves.25 Pipeline exports to 
Europe, including former Soviet Union countries, have been a source of export revenue and a 
foreign policy tool for the Russian government. However, because of the flattening demand 
in European OECD countries and fears about excessive dependence on Russian gas in light of 
Russia’s annexation of Crimea in March 2014, the prospects for market growth appear to be 
slim.26 Moreover, in the absence of new contracts and renewal of existing ones, by mid-2020, 
European customers will be obligated to import only 75% of the 2013 import levels annually, 
or 115 bcm.27 By 2030, this number will decrease to 65 bcm per year or 42% of the 2013 
import levels.28  
For these reasons, reaching beyond European markets has become a priority for the Russian 
government and Russian energy companies. With LNG prices in South Korea and Japan 
hovering in the $15 per MMBtu range in 2011 and 2013,29 and the perception of China’s 
massive appetite for natural gas, China and Southeast Asia have become the target region for 
Russian government and corporate decision-makers.30 At the time this article was written, 
Russia did not have gas pipelines connecting its giant West Siberian natural gas fields with 
new markets in China and Southeast Asia. However, Gazprom is currently in the process of 
unlocking Russia’s East Siberian natural gas fields and delivering their contents to China.  
                                                 
21 See generally, Roman Sidortsov, The Myth of Liberalization: the 2013 Changes in the Russian LNG Export 
Regime, Energy Law Journal, 35:2 (2014) [hereinafter Sidortsov, 2014]. 
22 Oxford, 2017 at 2. 
23 Id.  
24 EIA, Russia. 
25 Center for Strategic & International Studies, The Future of Russian Gas Exports, CSIS event on 22 July 2015. 
Washington, D.C., retrieved from https://www.csis.org/events/future-russian-gas-exports [hereinafter CSIS, 
2015]. 
26 The Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, Reducing European Dependence on Russian Gas: distinguishing 
natural gas security from geopolitics, (2014) retrieved from: http://www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/wp-
content/uploads/2014/10/NG-92.pdf [hereinafter Oxford, 2014]  
27 Id. 
28 Id.  
29 U.S. Energy Information Administration, Global Natural Gas Markets Overview: A Report Prepared by 
Leidos, Inc., Under Contract to EIA, (August 2014) retrieved from: 
https://www.eia.gov/workingpapers/pdf/global_gas.pdf at 5 [hereinafter EIA, 2014]. 
30 President of the Russian Federation, Transcript of presidential remarks at the investment forum 'Russia is 
Calling!', Moscow, (2 October 2014) [hereinafter 2 October 2014 Transcript] 
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On 21 May 2014, Gazprom and the Chairman of China National Petroleum Corporation 
(CNPC) signed an agreement for the Russian counterpart to supply 38 bcf of natural gas per 
year to China via a pipeline for 30 years.31 In order to do that, Gazprom will develop the 
Kovyktinskoe field in the Irkutsk Region with natural gas reserves of 1.5 tcm (24 tcf), and the 
Chayandinskoe field in the Sakha (Yakutia) Republic with natural gas reserves of 1.2 tcm (19 
tcf).32 Gazprom and CNPC are in the process of constructing the Power of Siberia unified gas 
transmission system (GTS), spanning about 4,000 kilometres and capable of delivering 61 
bcm per (978 bcf) per year.33 The Kremlin views the Power of Siberia GTS as an integral part 
of the state’s Eastern Gas Program. The Russian leadership likes to stress the overall 
economic development of the region, and its gasification in particular, as one of the main 
goals of the Eastern Gas Program. However, its underlying objective is to create a resource 
base and transport infrastructure for exports to China and Southeast Asia.3435 
Although the Power of Siberia agreement was heralded by the Russian leadership and 
Kremlin-aligned media as a triumph of Russia’s foreign energy policy,36 37 a closer look at 
the deal’s economics raises serious questions about its benefits for the Russia. In fact, after 
learning more details about the terms of the agreement, Morgan Stanley downgraded 
Gazprom’s stock ‘to reflect the signing of the deal with China’.38 Perhaps the most eloquent 
description of the deal lop-sidedness t came from James Sherr, a former head of Chatham 
House’s Russia and Eurasia Program, who stated that Russia received from China ‘tea and 
sympathy’.39 According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies, the project showed 
a small net present value (NPV), approximately $350 million, in May 2014 when the price of 
crude oil floated around $110 per barrel.40 However, when the oil price plummeted into the 
$20-per-barrel range, Power of Siberia’s NPV slid into negative $25 billion.41 Yet as of 
summer 2017, Gazprom appears to be ahead of schedule on the Russian portion of the 
route.42 
                                                 
31 Gazprom, Press Release, Alexey Miller: Russia and China signed the biggest contract in the entire history of 
Gazprom (21 May 2014) retrieved from http://www.gazprom.com/press/news/2014/may/article191451/.  
32 Gazprom. Gazprom, Power of Siberia, http://www.gazprom.com/about/production/projects/pipelines/ykv/ 
(last visited 15 September 2017). 
33 Id. 
34 Gazprom, Eastern Gas Program, http://www.gazprom.com/about/production/projects/east-program/ (last 
visited 15 September 2017). 
35 President of the Russian Federation, Transcript of the Commission on Matters Concerning the Development 
of the Energy and Fuel Sector and Environmental Security meeting, Astrakhan, (4 June 2014). 
36 Sidortsov, 2014. 
37 Richard Weitz, The Russia-China Gas Deal: Implications and Ramifications, World Affairs 
(September/October 2014) retrieved from http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/russia-china-gas-deal-
implications-and-ramifications. 
38 Tim Treadgold, Merrill Lynch Says Russia's Gas Deal With China Was A Political Win But A Business Loss, 
Forbes, (28 May 2014) retrieved from http://www.forbes.com/sites/timtreadgold/2014/05/28/merrill-lynch-says-
russias-gas-deal-with-china-was-a-political-win-but-a-business-loss/.  
39 Chatham House, The Russian Challenge, open event, London, (15 June 2015) retrieved from 
https://www.chathamhouse.org/publication/russian-challenge-authoritarian-nationalism.  
40 Pierre Noël, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Power of Siberia natural-gas project: 
commercial or political?, Politics and Strategy, (30 January 2017) retrieved from 
https://www.iiss.org/en/politics%20and%20strategy/blogsections/2017-6dda/january-7f20/power-of-siberia-
2a1d.   
41 Id. 
42 Gazprom, Gazprom News, Press Release, Russian gas supplies to China via Power of Siberia to start in 
December 2019, (4 July 2017) retrieved from http://www.gazprom.com/press/news/2017/july/article340477/.  
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The problematic economics of the Power of Siberia project are partially attributed to the cost 
of the greenfield resources base development (the Chayandinskoe and Kovyktinskoe natural 
gas fields).43 In contrast, many natural gas fields in Western Siberia do not come with the 
same costs, as some are already in the production stage and many are benefiting from already 
existing processing and transmission infrastructure.44 The already developed resource base is 
one of the main reasons why the Russian leadership has been heavily advocating the so-called 
‘western route’ or ‘the Power of Siberia 2’ to bring natural gas from Western Siberia to 
China.45 It seemed that reaching consensus regarding the western route was a matter of time – 
the parties signed a heads of agreement for gas supply in May 2015.46 However, as of June 
2017, the negotiations stalled due to China rethinking its supply needs, including the role of 
LNG in its’s energy future.47 Despite the rosy picture painted by the Russian leadership 
regarding the prospects of connecting Western Siberia fields to Asian markets, it has faced an 
uphill battle translating these prospects into reality from the very beginning.48 Gazprom has 
to compete against natural gas from Central Asia over which Chinese companies have 
upstream control and, paradoxically, the ‘eastern route’ gas.49  
Therefore, in the absence of concessions from China and continued demand dynamics in 
Europe, LNG facilities capable of serving European and Asian markets appear to be the best 
solution for Russia’s ambition of unlocking its vast natural gas resource base. This solution 
puts Russia on the pathway of becoming a swing supplier, a strategy articulated by President 
Vladimir Putin at the St. Petersburg Economic Forum in 2014: ‘We will have a unified gas 
supply system that will fundamentally and substantially improve gasification in Russian 
territories and will enable us to diversify the exports – when it is needed, in the Western 





                                                 
43 Center for Strategic & International Studies, Energy 360 Podcast, Russia: Energy & Geopolitics, (17 July 
2017) retrieved from https://www.csis.org/podcasts/energy-360.  
44 EIA, Russia. 
45 President of the Russian Federation, Transcript of the meeting with the heads of global news outlets, St. 
Petersburg (24 May 2014). 
46 Gazprom, Gazprom News, Press release, Gazprom and CNPC sign Heads of Agreement for gas supply via 
western route, (8 May 2015) retrieved from http://www.gazprom.com/press/news/2015/may/article226167/. 
47 Olesya Astakhova & Oksana Kobzeva, Russia-China talks over new gas routes stalled: sources, Reuters, (7 
June 2017) retrieved from http://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-china-energy-idUSKBN18Y1TX.  
48 President of the Russian Federation, Transcript of the meeting with participants of the World Business 
Leaders Summit, St. Petersburg, (23 May 2014) [hereinafter 23 May 2014 Transcript]; President of the Russian 
Federation, Transcript of the meeting with the Chairman of Gazprom's Board of Directors Alexei Miller, 
Moscow, (17 September 2014); 2 October 2014 Transcript. 
49 See generally: Keun-Wook Paik, Sino-Russian Oil and Gas Cooperation: The Reality and Implications 
(2012); James Henderson, The Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, The Commercial and Political Logic for the 
Altai Pipeline, (December 2014) retrieved from https://www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/wp-
content/uploads/2014/12/The-Commercial-and-Political-Logic-for-the-Altai-Pipeline-GPC-4.pdf. 
50 23 May 2014 Transcript. 
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4. Government Support for LNG  
The policy case for LNG expansion in Russia justifies government support for such projects, 
which the Russian government has provided generously. Lunden and Fjærtoft conducted an 
in-depth review of subsidies for the Yamal LNG project.51 As Table 2 summarizes, the 
government support for this project extended well beyond tax subsidies.52  
Table 2 Main subsidies for the Yamal LNG project 
Direct and indirect transfer of funds and liabilities 
Construction and operation of the following infrastructure: 
• Administrative facilities 
• Ice-protection construction 
• Port harbour 
• Approach channel 
• Seaway channel 
Substantial investment in the following facilities: 
• Sabetta seaport 
• Icebreaking fleet through state-owned company Atomflot 
• LNG tanker fleet through state-owned company Sovcomflot 
Payment of compensation for environmental harm due to industrial activities including 
dredging 
State bank (Vneshekonombank) involvement in the financing of the LNG tanker fleet 
Tax Subsidies 
Mineral Extraction Tax (MET) exemption for natural gas for up to 250 bcm during initial 
12 years of production and for natural gas liquids (NGLs) for up to 20 Mt during initial 12 
years of production 
Exemption for export duties (ED) for LNG and Stable Gas Condensate 
Exemption for property tax until 250 bcm of gas has been produced, but during 12 years 
from the time the property was put into service 
Reduced profit tax rate, 13.5% (from 18%) for the first 250 bcm of gas production during 
the initial 12 years of production 
                                                 
51 Lunden, L. P. and Fjaertoft, D., WWF, IISD, GSI, & Sigragroup, Government Support to Upstream Oil & Gas 





Immediate accelerated depreciation allowance for up to 30% for fixed assets 
Accelerated (double the regular rate) depreciation for the assets located in the Arctic zone 
Other Subsidies 
The Yuzhno-Tambeyskoe natural gas field initial exploration and development costs were 
borne by the Soviet government when the field was first discovered in 1974 
Licence to Novatek subsidiary, Tambeyneftegaz, was issued on uncertain terms 
Changes in the natural gas export legislation, allowing Yamal LNG to contract with foreign 
customers directly 
Lunden and Fjærtoft estimate the total value of Russian government support of the Yamal 
LNG project to be $7.4 billion, including $3.3 billion in dredging costs and $4.1 billion for 
the development of the Sabetta infrastructure.53 Notably, at a minimum, $5.75 billion would 
essentially constitute a gift to Novatek and its partners.54 Lunden and Fjærtoft also estimate a 
government revenue decrease from 77% to 24% due to all the aforementioned tax subsidies.55 
This drop would translate into an approximate $15 billion tax revenue loss at the natural gas 
price of $12 per MMBtu, condensate price of $100 per barrel, and the exchange rate of 30 
rubles per U.S. dollar.56  
As Table 2 suggests, the Russian government employs a wide array of tools to support LNG 
projects, which is in line with the Kremlin’s patronage of the oil and gas sector. These tools 
include assistance with obtaining ‘cheap money’ financing,57 especially during the initial 
phase.58 Perhaps the most vivid example of the Yamal LNG project being a top priority of the 
Kremlin came after the United States and European Union imposed economic sanctions in 
response to Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, which increased project financing costs.59 
The Kremlin showed little hesitation, authorizing transfers from the National Welfare Fund 
(NWF) to ease the financing costs burden whilst the national economy was struggling.60 The 
fact that financing assistance came from the NWF and not from the Reserve Fund (RF) shows 
that the Kremlin is willing to dip into any available revenue source. The RF was created, 
among other things, to ‘bring stability of the country’s economic development’ and ‘lower 
the national economy’s dependence on finite natural resource price volatility.’ 
Correspondingly, the RF is funded from oil and gas export duty and mineral extraction tax 
                                                 
53 President of the Russian Federation, Transcript of the meeting regarding implementation of the Yamal LNG 
project and construction of Sabetta sea port, Salehard, (26 September 2013). 
54 Id. 
55 Lunden and Fjaertoft, 2014. 
56 Lunden and Fjaertoft, 2014; Ivetta Gerasimchuk, WWF & IISD, Fossil fuels – at what cost?: Government 
support for upstream oil and gas activities in Russia (2012).  
57 President of the Russian Federation, Transcript of the meeting of the Commission on the strategic 
development of the energy and fuel sector and environmental security, Moscow, (10 July 2012). 
58 President of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin’s post-G20 meeting press-conference, St. Petersburg, (6 
September 2013). 
59 EIA, Russia; 31 October 2014 Transcript. 
60 31 October 2014 Transcript. 
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revenues.61 However, the NWF’s main objective is to provide ‘sustainable mechanism for 
pension support’ through ‘co-financing voluntary pension deposits of Russian citizens’.62 
In addition, the Tax Code, which in theory applies equally to all taxpayers, is frequently used 
for what is known as pinpoint ‘tuning’ of energy projects.63 For example, the 21 July 2011 
Tax Code amendments, pursuant to which Novatek received the aforementioned ED and 12-
year MET exemptions, listed the geographic location of the exempt deposits that tailored the 
subsidy for Yamal LNG and its expansion.64 Therefore, the Russian taxation regime has 
sufficient flexibility to manipulate the effective tax rate and legislatively create individual tax 
holidays. In addition, the Kremlin’s control of the Federation Council ensures that 
amendments to the Tax Code are passed at will.65  
Yet the example of generous support that Yamal LNG received from the Russian government 
does not mean that any company with a sensible business plan that aligns with the Kremlin’s 
policy goals receives such support. As of summer 2017, only three companies, Gazprom, 
Rosneft, and Novatek possessed the right to export LNG. Investigating the scope of each 
company’s right and likely reasons for possessing it is a useful exercise for forecasting the 
development of Russia’s LNG sector.  
Until late November 2013, under Russian law, only Gazprom possessed such right as the 
owner of the Unified Gas Supply System (UGSS).66 On 30 November 2013, federal laws, 
‘On Exports of Natural Gas’ and ‘On Foreign Commerce’, were amended to grant the right to 
two additional types of entities (the ‘LNG Export Amendments’).67  
The first type comprises entities whose subsoil use licence satisfies the following three 
criteria. First, the licence must cover deposits of ‘federal significance’.68 Russian law 
designates such deposits for ‘the purposes of defence and security of the state’.69 Deposits of 
federal significance include: (i) all deposits with recoverable reserves of seventy million 
tonnes or more of oil or fifty billion cubic meters (bcm) or more of natural gas; and (ii) all 
mineral deposits (regardless of their size) located on the territory of internal sea waters, 
territorial sea, and continental shelf.70 Second, the licence must provide for construction of an 
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LNG plant or provide for transmission of the extracted natural gas to an LNG plant.71 Third, 
the licence must have contained this LNG plant provision before 1 January 2013.72  
The second type comprises entities that are permitted to access offshore oil and gas resources 
under the federal laws ‘On Subsoil Resources’ and ‘On the Continental Shelf’.73 In addition, 
such entities must meet either of the following two sets of conditions: the users of offshore 
subsoil resources must produce LNG (i) from the gas that they extract, or (ii) from the gas 
produced by another company pursuant to a PSA. In either case, the Russian Federation must 
own more than 50 % of such an entity’s common stock and/or control more than 50% of the 
voting stock.74 Under the second set, the users of offshore subsoil resources must be 
subsidiaries of the entities that produce LNG from the gas extracted pursuant to a PSA and 
must otherwise satisfy the first set of conditions. In addition, an eligible parent company must 
own more than 50% of the subsidiary’s voting stock. 
These ostensibly confusing requirements appear to be tailored to the aforementioned 
companies and the current and prospective projects highlighted above. The first type of 
entities includes a peculiar condition – all eligible licenses must have been issued prior to 1 
January 2013.75 The explanatory legislative note that came with the LNG Export 
Amendments bill stated concerns over natural gas supply for domestic use as the main reason 
for the 1 January 2013 license date.76 Accordingly, the note stated not all natural gas licence 
holders would automatically obtain the right to export LNG.77 As stated above, Russia has 
had a stagnant domestic natural gas market. It also has plentiful spare production and pipeline 
capacity.78 Therefore, the concerns over supply for the domestic market stated in the 
explanatory note were non-existent. It appears that the real reason for this bundle of peculiar 
conditions, including the 1 January 2013 requirement was to create a list of winners eligible 
to export. It turns out that the list was very short. To be precise, it contained only one 
company, Novatek, as this was the only entity with a pre-2013 licence to develop natural gas 
deposits of federal significance and to build an LNG plant (or transport of extracted natural 
gas to an LNG plant).79 
The second type of entities that the LNG Export Amendments created appear to be designed 
for offshore projects operated by Rosneft and joint ventures under Rosneft’s and Gazprom’s 
control. Russian law does not explicitly recognize offshore mineral resources as a separate 
category.80 The functional equivalent of this category is mineral resources located on the 
territory of internal sea waters, territorial sea, and continental shelf.81 As noted above, these 
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resources are deemed of federal significance.82 Russian policy-makers view hydrocarbon 
deposits that are at least partially located on the continental shelf, as a special resource 
subcategory. In order to have access to these resources, an entity must comply with the 
following requirements: (i) be formed under the laws of the Russian Federation; (ii) have five 
or more years of experience operating on the Russian continental shelf; and (iii) more than 
50% of the entity’s voting stock must to be under control of the Russian state.83 These 
requirements make Gazprom and Rosneft the only two companies eligible to access 
significant offshore hydrocarbon deposits in Russia.84  
The requirements came into force in 2008 as a result of a lobbying campaign spearheaded by 
then Deputy Prime Minister Igor Sechin.85 Mr Sechin, who has been Rosneft’s chief 
executive officer since 2012, served as the chairman of Rosneft’s board of directors from 
2004 until 2011. Mr Sechin’s received support from Dmitry Medvedev with whom Vladimir 
Putin swapped President and Prime Minister seats in 2008.86 Dmitry Medvedev served as 
deputy head of the Gazprom board of directors and head of the board of directors in 2000-
2002 whilst playing an important role in Gazprom’s takeover by members of Vladimir 
Putin’s inner circle.87 
Unsurprisingly, Rosneft was the driving force behind the LNG Export Amendments in 
2013.88 Joining Rosneft’s lobbying effort was Novatek, another company with close ties to 
the Kremlin. As of 2014, Gennady Timchenko, a Novatek board member and major 
shareholder, was also a 43% owner of Gunvor, an energy trading company.89 According to 
the U.S. Department of the Treasury (the “Treasury”), President Putin had close financial 
connections to Gunvor through Mr Timchenko: 
Gennady Timchenko is one of the founders of Gunvor, one of the world’s 
largest independent commodity trading companies involved in the oil and 
energy markets. Timchenko’s activities in the energy sector have been 
directly linked to Putin. Putin has investments in Gunvor and may have 
access to Gunvor funds.90 
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In fact, the Treasury used this finding to justify placing Gennady Timchenko on the list of 
sanctioned persons and companies after the March 2014 referendum in Crimea on whether 
the region should leave Ukraine and join Russia.91  
On 13 February 2013, at the Meeting of the Presidential Commission on the Strategy of Fuel 
and Energy Sector Development and Environmental Security, the strategic decision on the 
LNG Export Amendments was made. During this meeting, Mr Sechin asked President 
Vladimir Putin to consider expanding the right to export natural gas to companies that have 
access to the Russian continental shelf’s hydrocarbon resources: 
Taking into account . . . the fact that Article 23 of the statute ‘On Subsoil 
Resources’ requires comprehensive development of oil and gas deposits 
located on the continental shelf, we are asking you to consider liberalizing 
gas exports. What is meant here is only liquefied gas. The timing of these 
decisions is of strategic importance, as they need to be made in response to 
the opportunities presented by the global markets and the development of 
the global economy.92  
Igor Sechin also stated that the ‘liberalization proposed by us’ will not hurt Gazprom, ‘our 
main gas producer’.93 Remarkably, he confirmed that the LNG Export Amendments were 
drafted with both predetermined entities and predetermined projects in mind.94  
The LNG Export Amendments bill took only a few weeks to land on President Putin’s desk. 
During this rather brief legislative process, an additional amendment was made that made 
Lukoil, the country’s second-largest oil producer and fourth-largest natural gas producer, as 
an entity eligible to export LNG.95 However, this amendment was rejected, along with a later 
stand-alone bill that would have moved the license cut-off date from 1 January 2013 to 1 July 
2014.96 The failure to pass the latter forced ALLTEK, the company that was allegedly behind 
the stand-alone bill, to sell its majority share in the Pechora LNG project in May 2014 to 
Rosneft.97 Whilst preparing for the deal, the Federal Agency for Mineral Resources 
(Rosnedra) amended ALLTEK’s licence to cover LNG-related activities.98  
The LNG Export Amendments were heralded as liberalization of the Russian LNG export 
regime. I argued against this designation—if anything the LNG Export Amendments 
highlighted the control that the Russian government exercises over the energy sector.99 
Although two additional types of entities were allowed to export LNG, the change did not 
amount to lessening the government’s control over access to the market. In contrast, it 
reinforced the cardinal rule of succeeding in the oil and gas business in Russia – one must go 
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to and through the Kremlin to have any chance at gaining access to significant hydrocarbon 
resources and/or export markets. Yet showing up at the Kremlin’s Spasskaya Tower gate with 
a VIP pass and a brilliant business plan will not suffice. The access that Novatek and Rosneft 
received after the enactment of the LNG Export Amendments was premised on the deep, 
mutually beneficial relationship between the very top of the Russian state leadership and the 
top corporate decision-makers.  
5. Barriers to LNG Development in Russia 
Owners of LNG projects in Russia face similar challenges as their counterparts around the 
world. Near five- and threefold natural gas price differences between Asian and European 
regional markets (respectively) and Henry Hub prices in the United States do not 
automatically translate into long-term LNG contracts and, correspondingly, new LNG 
projects.100 As of summer 2017, there are not enough buyers willing to enter into typical 
long-term LNG contracts.101 In fact, as of May 2017, only about 50% of the LNG capacity 
under construction in the United States has been sold to end users.102 According to Fereidun 
Fesharaki, the oversupply in the long-term contract market is likely to exist through 2023.103 
In addition, the LNG spot market finds itself overwhelmed by a depressed price lull.104 
Whereas the current situation on the long-term contract market should serve as a stern 
warning to prudent developers and financiers, the spot market dynamics should discourage 
even those willing to gamble.  
Yet the buyers’ contract and spot markets are not the only challenges that Russian LNG 
projects face. What they, especially those located in the Arctic, might gain from their 
advantageous geographic location, they might lose because of geopolitical factors. On 2 
August 2017, in the United States, a legislative bill codifying and expanding economic 
sanctions imposed by the Obama administration against Russia became law.105 The 
legislation, H.R. 3364-21, entitled ‘Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions 
Act’, does not specifically include LNG in the scope of sanctioned projects.106 However, 
several provisions indirectly complicate LNG development in Russia. First, the act gives the 
president authority to impose sanctions on individuals or entities, regardless of their 
nationality, that invest in Russian natural gas export pipelines.107 The act further clarifies the 
term ‘investment’ as ‘an investment that directly and significantly contributes to the 
enhancement of the ability of the Russian Federation to construct energy export pipelines’.108 
Therefore, an argument can be made that if economic viability of an export pipeline at least 
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in part depends on the commodity diverted to an LNG export terminal, an investment in the 
LNG terminal might fall under the purview of the act. Examples of proposed projects that are 
supplied by export pipelines are Vladivostok LNG and Baltic LNG.  
Second, the act affirms sanctions related to new ‘deepwater, Arctic offshore, or shale 
projects’ that have ‘the potential to produce oil’.109 Although this provision does not affect 
purely natural gas projects, it appears to impact projects that target both oil and gas. The latter 
are not a rarity; in fact, there are two examples among the operating and proposed LNG 
projects in Russia. Sakhalin LNG receives natural gas from the Piltun-Astokhskoye field that 
produces both oil and associate gas.110 The proposed Far Eastern LNG is projected to tap into 
the Chayvo field, part of which is located offshore. Similarly to Piltun-Astokhskoye, Chayvo 
also produces both oil and gas.111 Yet neither field is located in the Arctic or utilizes 
deepwater or shale resources. Such ‘exonerating’ circumstances notwithstanding, this 
provision is likely to limit the resource base available for prospective LNG projects.  
The third and perhaps most significant complication of the act comes in the form of Subtitle 
B—Countering Russian Influence in Europe and Eurasia of Title II. Section 257 entitled 
‘Ukrainian Energy Security’ commences with the following pertinent policy statements: 
(7) to help Ukraine and United States allies and partners in Europe reduce 
their dependence on Russian energy resources, especially natural gas, which 
the Government of the Russian Federation uses as a weapon to coerce, 
intimidate, and influence other countries; 
(8) to work with European Union member states and European Union 
institutions to promote energy security through developing diversified and 
liberalized energy markets that provide diversified sources, suppliers, and 
routes; 
. . . . 
(10) that the United States Government should prioritize the export of United 
States energy resources in order to create American jobs, help United States 
allies and partners, and strengthen United States foreign policy.112 
To further these policy statements, the Export-Import Bank of the United States and the 
Overseas Private Investment Corporation are encouraged to ‘play key roles in supporting 
critical energy projects that contribute to that goal’.113 The act also directs ‘[a]mounts in the 
Countering Russian Influence Fund’, established by the act, to support technical advice 
directed at enhancing energy security and lowering dependence on Russian energy sources.114 
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In addition, the act authorizes $30 million for the U.S. Department of State to support 
activities aimed at increasing energy security in Ukraine.115 
The approach taken in the ‘Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act’ 
received criticism in Europe as patronizing, lacking nuance, and excessively strong-
handed.116 Yet despite the criticism, there appears to be a general agreement between the 
United States and the European Union about reliance on Russian natural gas. In fact, since 
Russia’s annexation of Crimea in the spring of 2014, in Europe, the issue of natural gas 
supplies from Russia has been largely framed in terms of dependence reduction.117 This 
framing became particularly clear to me after speaking to several military officials from the 
Baltic States and Poland in the spring of 2017. One official stated that the European Union 
should move away from Russian gas regardless of economic costs. Although this sentiment 
might not be reflective of official government policies of European Union members, it 
represents powerful voices in the political discourse that is already influenced by the 
Kremlin’s recent adventurism. Russia’s aspiration of becoming a meaningful swing supplier, 
at least in the long-term market, is thus likely to face stiff opposition in Europe.  
One might argue that having long-term contract arrangements in Europe is not as important 
for owners of LNG projects in Russia because of the strong support they receive from the 
Russian government. Under this logic, the owners can still ‘swing’ to the European spot 
market when an opportunity arises. There are two problems with this argument. First, support 
from the Russian government is unlikely to be infinite. The Russian budget has been battered 
by the economic stagnation exacerbated by the low oil prices and E.U. and U.S. economic 
sanctions.118 According to the Russian Finance Ministry, as of 1 September 2017, the RF has 
$17.06 billion or 1.1% of Russia’s GDP. In comparison, the RF proceeds climbed to $142.60 
billion or 8.5% of GDP, the highest-ever point since the RF inception on 1 September 2008, 
and to $91.72 billion or 4.3% of GDP, the highest point since the 2009 global recession, on 1 
July 2014.119 Regarding the NWF, as of 1 September the fund holds $75.36 billion or 4.8% of 
Russia’s GDP. The NWF proceeds that are not purposed to provide economic aid and do not 
come directly from oil and gas tax and export duty revenues climbed to their highest-ever 
point of $94.34 billion on 1 May 2011.120  
The second problem lies in the systemic and often intentional economic inefficiency of many 
Russian companies operating in the oil and gas sector. Staggering cost overruns continue to 
puzzle Western energy analysts entrenched in the neoclassical mindset.121 For example, the 
cost of Nord Stream pipeline per kilometre construction on the Russian side exceeded those 
on the German side by the factor of three.122 This is especially remarkable given the 
ostensibly lower labour costs in Russia and that oil and gas pipeline projects are not subject to 
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environmental impact assessment (EIA) under Russian law.123 Another example is even more 
staggering – to bring the Bovanenkovo natural gas field online, Gazprom could have 
connected it to the existing trunk pipeline network by building a 500-kilometre link. In fact, 
building this link has been the plan for years. Instead, the company chose to build two new 
pipelines, Bovanenkovo–Ukhta and Ukta-Torzhok (Gryazovets), with a combined length of 
2,170 kilometres and price tag of $44 billion.124 Such practices allow companies to employ 
business models that make money on costs and not profits.125 This is not to say that an entity 
cannot change a business model premised on cost inflation when systemic opportunities to do 
so disappear. However, it is safe to assume that this entity will face a steep learning curve, 
especially considering tough global competition and limited government support. 
6. Conclusion 
The Russian leadership faces a threshold decision – either to continue its policy of extreme 
patronage or begin levelling the playing field and hope that technological and business 
innovation will overcome geopolitical bias and tough international competition. As noted 
above, on 26 May 2014, nearly seven months after the LNG Export Amendments were 
signed into law, a legislative bill proposing to extend the 1 January 2013 cut-off date for 
otherwise eligible license holders to 1 July 2014 was introduced. As of September 2017, the 
bill is still under consideration by the State Duma.126 The Kremlin’s take on the bill in the 
document entitled ‘Official Response by the Government of the Russian Federation’ notes 
that ‘further liberalization of LNG is only possible after the analysis of the most recent 
amendments results.’127 The fact that the bill has not been purged by the Duma’s legislative 
machinery suggests that the current trio of companies might not be final. However, a 
potential increase in the number of companies allowed to export LNG in Russia will not 
automatically mean market liberalization and improved chances of Russian projects to 
compete on the world stage. Given tight government control over the oil and gas sector in 
Russia, newcomers might include companies with close ties to the Kremlin that missed the 
cut in 2013.128 As a result, Russian LNG projects face real danger of being stuck at the 
crossroads of policy ambition and structural barriers, some of which are self-inflicted. 
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